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Measuring Treasury 
Market Liquidity
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
any important uses of U.S. Treasury securities stem from 
the securities’ immense liquidity. Market participants, for 
example, use Treasuries to hedge positions in other fixed-
income securities and to speculate on the course of interest rates 
because they can buy and sell Treasuries quickly and with low 
transaction costs. The high volume of trading and narrow bid-
ask spreads also help make Treasury rates reliable reference rates 
for pricing and analyzing other securities. In addition, the 
Federal Reserve System, foreign central banks, and depositary 
institutions hold Treasuries as a reserve asset in part because they 
can buy and sell them quickly with minimal market impact.1
The liquidity of the Treasury market has received particular 
attention in recent years. This heightened focus is partly 
attributable to the financial market turmoil in the fall of 1998, 
when liquidity was disrupted across markets and investors 
sought the safety and liquidity of Treasuries.2 It is also 
attributable to concerns about liquidity arising from the federal 
government’s reduced funding needs in the late 1990s and the 
resultant reduction in the supply of Treasuries.3 Several debt 
management changes—such as the launch of the debt buyback 
program in January 2000—were motivated by the Treasury’s 
desire to maintain liquidity in such an environment.4
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• U.S. Treasury securities are important to a 
range of market-related trading and analytical 
activities because of the securities’ immense 
liquidity.
• Recently, the availability of high-frequency 
data has enabled detailed analyses of 
Treasury market liquidity. Measures such as 
the bid-ask spread, quote size, trade size, and 
price impact can now be used to assess and 
track liquidity more effectively.
• An examination of these and other liquidity 
measures for the U.S. Treasury market finds 
that the commonly used bid-ask spread—the 
difference between bid and offer prices—is a 
useful tool for assessing and tracking liquidity. 
• Other measures, such as quote and trade 
sizes, prove to be only modest tools for 
assessing and tracking liquidity, while trading 
volume and frequency are in fact poor 
measures of liquidity.
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Historically, few studies have analyzed Treasury market 
liquidity—despite its importance.5 Recently, however, the 
availability of high-frequency data has spurred several detailed 
analyses. Fleming (1997), for example, documents the intraday 
patterns of bid-ask spreads and trading volume in the round-
the-clock interdealer market. Fleming and Remolona (1997, 
1999), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001), and Huang, Cai, and 
Wang (2002) analyze bid-ask spreads and trading activity 
around macroeconomic announcements. Fleming (2002), 
Strebulaev (2002), and Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2003) 
examine liquidity across subgroups of securities and over 
securities’ life cycles and relate liquidity differences to price 
differences. Brandt and Kavajecz (2003), Cohen and Shin 
(2003), and Green (forthcoming) explore how order flow 
affects prices.
This article adds to the literature by estimating and 
evaluating a comprehensive set of liquidity measures for the 
U.S. Treasury securities market. High-frequency data from the 
interdealer market allow for an analysis of trading volume, 
trading frequency, bid-ask spreads, quote sizes, trade sizes, 
price impact coefficients, and on-the-run/off-the-run yield 
spreads. The variables are analyzed relative to one another, 
across securities, and over time in an effort to assess how 
liquidity can best be measured and tracked.
The measurement and tracking of liquidity are of relevance 
to those who transact in the market, those who monitor market 
conditions, and those who analyze market developments. As a 
measure of trading costs, for example, liquidity affects the 
incentives of dealers, hedge funds, and others to engage in 
hedging and speculative activity. As a barometer of market 
conditions, liquidity signals to policymakers the willingness of 
market makers to commit capital and take risks in financial 
markets. Those interested in understanding the determinants 
of liquidity, the price formation process, and the effects of 
liquidity on prices are also naturally interested in how liquidity 
can be measured and tracked.
Our analysis reveals that the simple bid-ask spread—the 
difference between bid and offer prices—is a useful measure for 
assessing and tracking Treasury market liquidity. The bid-ask 
spread can be calculated quickly and easily with data that are 
widely available on a real-time basis. Nonetheless, the spread is 
highly correlated with the more sophisticated price impact 
measure and it is correlated with episodes of reported poor 
liquidity in the expected manner. The bid-ask spread thus 
increases sharply with equity market declines in October 1997, 
with the financial market turmoil in the fall of 1998, and with 
the market disruptions around the Treasury’s quarterly 
refunding announcement in February 2000.
Conversely, quote size, trade size, and on-the-run/off-the-
run yield spread are found to be only modest proxies for 
market liquidity. These measures correlate less strongly with 
the episodes of reported poor liquidity and with the bid-ask 
spread and price impact measures. Furthermore, trading 
volume and trading frequency are weak proxies for market 
liquidity, as both high and low levels of trading activity are 
associated with periods of poor liquidity.
It is worth noting that this article complements work on the 
equity and foreign exchange (FX) markets (Goodhart and 
O’Hara [1997] and Madhavan [2000] survey the literature). 
The analysis of price impact coefficients, in particular, is related 
to studies of the FX market by Evans (1999), Payne (2000), and 
Evans and Lyons (2002), who find that a high proportion of 
exchange rate changes can be explained by order flow alone. 
We uncover a similar relationship between order flow and 
price changes in the Treasury market, with a simple model of 
price changes producing an R2 statistic above 30 percent for the 
two-year note.
In addition, our analysis of liquidity measures complements 
studies that analyze commonality in liquidity in equity markets 
(Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2000, Hasbrouck and 
Seppi 2001, and Huberman and Halka 2001) and between 
equity and Treasury markets (Chordia, Sarkar, and 
Subrahmanyam 2003). Commonality in liquidity across 
securities is likely to be strong in the Treasury market given the 
securities’ common features. Moreover, the high volume of 
trading in the Treasury market and the absence of rules that 
limit price changes or bid-ask spreads to specified minimums 
or maximums make it relatively easy to estimate measures of 
liquidity precisely. Correlation coefficients across Treasuries 
are in fact found to be quite high for the various measures, 
indicating that the liquidity of one security can serve as a 
reasonable proxy for the market as a whole.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes market 
liquidity and how it is typically measured in practice; Section 3 
discusses the data and the sample period; Section 4 presents 
empirical results for the individual liquidity measures; Section 5 
examines the relationships among the measures.
This article adds to the literature 
by estimating and evaluating a 
comprehensive set of liquidity measures 
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2. Measures of Liquidity
A liquid market is defined as one in which trades can be 
executed with no cost (O’Hara 1995; Engle and Lange 1997). 
In practice, a market with very low transaction costs is 
characterized as liquid and one with high transaction costs as 
illiquid. Measuring these costs is not simple, however, as they 
depend on the size of a trade, its timing, the trading venue, and 
the counterparties. Furthermore, the information needed to 
calculate transaction costs is often not available. As a 
consequence, a variety of measures are employed to evaluate a 
market’s liquidity.
The bid-ask spread is a commonly used measure of market 
liquidity. It directly measures the cost of executing a small 
trade, with the cost typically calculated as the difference 
between the bid or offer price and the bid-ask midpoint (or 
one-half of the bid-ask spread). The measure can thus quickly 
and easily be calculated with data that are widely available on a 
real-time basis. However, a drawback of the bid-ask spread is 
that bid and offer quotes are good only for limited quantities 
and periods of time. The spread therefore only measures the 
cost of executing a single trade of limited size.
The quantity of securities that can be traded at the bid and 
offer prices helps account for the depth of the market and 
complements the bid-ask spread as a measure of market 
liquidity. A simple estimate of this quantity is the quote size, or 
the quantity of securities that is explicitly bid for or offered for 
sale at the posted bid and offer prices. A drawback of this 
estimate, however, is that market makers often do not reveal 
the full quantities they are willing to transact at a given price, so 
the measured depth underestimates the true depth.
An alternative measure of market depth is trade size. Trade 
size is an ex-post measure of the quantity of securities that can 
be traded at the bid or offer price, reflecting any negotiation 
over quantity that takes place. Trade size also underestimates 
market depth, however, as the quantity traded is often less than 
the quantity that could have been traded at a given price. In 
addition, any measure of the quantity of securities that can be 
traded at the bid and offer prices does not, by definition, 
consider the cost of executing larger trades.
A popular measure of liquidity, suggested by Kyle (1985), 
considers the rise (fall) in price that typically occurs with a 
buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trade. The Kyle lambda is 
defined as the slope of the line that relates the price change to 
trade size and is typically estimated by regressing price changes 
on net volume for intervals of fixed time. The measure is 
relevant to those executing large trades or a series of trades, and 
together with the bid-ask spread and depth measures provides 
a fairly complete picture of market liquidity. A drawback of this 
measure, though, is that the data required for estimation, 
including the side initiating a trade, are often difficult to obtain, 
particularly on a real-time basis.
A liquidity measure used in the Treasury market is the 
“liquidity” spread between more and less liquid securities, 
often calculated as the difference between the yield of an on-
the-run security and that of an off-the-run security with similar 
cash flow characteristics.6 Since liquidity has value, more liquid 
securities tend to have higher prices (lower yields) than less 
liquid securities, as shown by Amihud and Mendelson (1991) 
and Kamara (1994). A nice feature of the liquidity spread is that 
it can be calculated without high-frequency data. Moreover, 
because the spread reflects both the price of liquidity as well as 
differences in liquidity between securities, it provides insight 
into the value of liquidity not provided by the other measures. 
The spread can be difficult to interpret, however, for the same 
reason. In addition, factors besides liquidity can cause on-the-
run securities to trade at a premium, confounding the 
interpretation of the spread.7 Furthermore, the choice of an 
off-the-run benchmark against which to compare an on-the-
run security can result in considerable estimation error.
Trading volume is an indirect but widely cited measure of 
market liquidity. Its popularity may stem from the fact that more 
active markets, such as the Treasury market, tend to be more 
liquid, and from theoretical studies that link increased trading 
activity with improved liquidity. The measure’s popularity may 
also reflect its simplicity and availability, with volume figures 
regularly reported in the press and released by the Federal 
Reserve. A drawback of trading volume, however, is that it is also 
associated with volatility (Karpoff 1987), which is thought to 
impede market liquidity. The implications of changes in trading 
activity for market liquidity are therefore not always clear.
A closely related measure of market liquidity is trading 
frequency. Trading frequency equals the number of trades 
executed within a specified interval, without regard to trade 
size. Like trading volume, high trading frequency may reflect a 
more liquid market, but it is also associated with volatility and 
lower liquidity. In fact, Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) show 
that the positive volume-volatility relationship found in many 
The bid-ask spread [the difference 
between bid and offer prices] is a 
commonly used measure of market 
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equity market studies reflects the positive relationship between 
the number of trades and volatility, and that trade size has little 
incremental information content.
3. Data and Sample Period
Description
Our primary data source is GovPX, Inc. GovPX consolidates 
data from all but one of the major brokers in the interdealer 
market and transmits the data to subscribers in real time 
through on-line vendors.8 The posted data include the best bid 
and offer quotes, the associated quote sizes, the price and size 
of each trade, and whether the trade was a “take” (buyer-
initiated) or a “hit” (seller-initiated). We use a history of these 
postings, provided by GovPX, that includes the time of each 
posting to the second.
Because GovPX consolidates data from all but one of the 
major brokers, it provides a good, but not complete, picture of 
interdealer activity. Data reported to the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York by the primary dealers indicate average daily 
trading of $108 billion in the interdealer broker market in the 
first quarter of 2000 (and $105 billion in the dealer-to-
customer market). The comparable GovPX figure is $46 billion, 
implying market coverage of about 42 percent.9 This share has 
been falling fairly quickly in recent years, averaging 65 percent 
in 1997, 57 percent in 1998, and 52 percent in 1999.
The decline in GovPX market coverage has been particularly 
severe among coupon securities, as noted by Boni and Leach 
(2002b). Estimated GovPX coverage of coupon securities with 
five years or less to maturity fell from 70 percent in 1997 to 
39 percent in the first quarter of 2000. Estimated coverage of 
coupon securities with more than five years to maturity fell 
from 37 percent to 19 percent over the same period. In 
contrast, estimated GovPX bill coverage exceeded 90 percent in 
every year in the sample.
The incompleteness of the data can cause estimated liquidity 
measures to be biased measures of liquidity in the interdealer 
market as a whole, and to become more biased over time. Such 
a bias is obvious in the case of the trading activity measures, but 
it is also true for measures such as the bid-ask spread and the 
price impact coefficient. In the case of the bid-ask spread, for 
example, the spread between the best bid and the best offer 
prices based on a subset of activity in the interdealer market is 
never narrower, but sometimes wider, than the comparable 
spread for the complete interdealer market.
To mitigate the biases due to declining coverage, the 
measures for the coupon securities are adjusted and reported as 
if GovPX coverage was constant at its average levels over the 
sample period.10 Note that the adjustment methodology, 
described in the box, does not attempt to correct for biases in 
the measures due to the level of GovPX coverage, but is instead 
intended to reduce biases due to changes in GovPX coverage.
Despite these data issues, the estimated liquidity 
measures are nonetheless highly informative about liquidity 
in the interdealer market. First, the incompleteness of 
GovPX coverage applies almost entirely to coupon 
securities, so that the liquidity measures estimated for bills 
are not appreciably biased. Second, as GovPX coverage of 
coupon securities deteriorates gradually over the sample 
period, the week-to-week changes in the liquidity measures 
are highly informative about short-term liquidity changes in 
the broader market.
An interesting feature of the interdealer market is the 
negotiation that takes place over quantities (Boni and Leach 
[2002a] provide a detailed analysis of this phenomenon). 
Trades often go through a “workup” process, in which a broker 
mediates an increase in trade size beyond the amount quoted. 
For these trades, the brokers’ screens first indicate that a trade 
is occurring and then update the trade size until the trade’s 
completion many seconds later. The GovPX data are processed 
and analyzed in a manner that treats the outcomes of these 
workup processes as single trades. The appendix discusses this 
and other data processing issues in detail.
In contrast to the negotiation over trade sizes, there is no 
price negotiation in the interdealer market, so trades only go 
off at posted bid or offer prices. As a result, quoted bid-ask 
spreads provide an accurate indication of the spreads facing 
market participants.11
This article focuses on the liquidity of the on-the-run bills and 
notes. Even though on-the-run securities represent just a small 
fraction of the roughly 200 Treasury securities outstanding, they 
account for 71 percent of activity in the interdealer market 
(Fabozzi and Fleming 2000). We exclude the three-year note 
from our analyses because the Treasury suspended issuance of 
[Our sample period] covers the Thai baht 
devaluation in July 1997, the equity 
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financial market turmoil of fall 1998, and 
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this security in 1998. Also excluded are the thirty-year bond, due 
to limited coverage by GovPX, and Treasury inflation-indexed 
securities, due to their limited trading activity.
Most of our analyses are conducted and presented at the 
daily and weekly level and are typically based on data from 
New York trading hours (defined as 7:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., eastern 
time).12 The aggregation dampens some of the idiosyncratic 
variation in the liquidity measures and largely removes time-
of-day patterns (and day-of-week patterns in the case of the 
weekly aggregated data). The limitation to New York trading 
Adjusting the Liquidity Measures for Changes in GovPX Coverage
To adjust the liquidity measures for the coupon securities, we first 
calculate weekly GovPX trading volume coverage ratios for the 
different sectors of the Treasury market. The primary dealers 
report their trading activity through interdealer brokers by sector 
(bills, coupon securities with maturities of less than or equal to five 
years, and coupon securities with maturities of more than five 
years) on a weekly basis. We calculate GovPX trading volume for 
comparable sectors and weeks, and then calculate GovPX coverage 
ratios as twice the ratio of GovPX trading volume in a sector to 
dealers’ reported interdealer broker volume in a sector (see 
endnote 9).
Trading volume and net trading volume for the coupon 
securities are then scaled up or down by the ratio of the GovPX 
coverage ratio in that sector over the entire sample period to the 
GovPX coverage ratio for that week. For example, GovPX coverage 
of coupon securities with less than or equal to five years to maturity 
equals 62 percent over the entire sample. In a week in which the 
ratio equals 52 percent, the raw volume numbers for the relevant 
securities (the two- and five-year notes) are multiplied by 1.19 
(1.19 = 62 percent/52 percent).
The other measures are adjusted based on the results of 
regression analyses. We first regress weekly bid-ask spread, quote 
size, trade size, and price impact measures for each security on the 
share of that sector covered by GovPX, on price volatility in that 
security, and on a dummy variable equal to 1 for the week ending 
August 21, 1998, and thereafter. Because volume numbers are 
reported to the Federal Reserve for weeks ending Wednesday, we 
calculate a weighted-average GovPX coverage ratio for each 
calendar week using the coverage ratios of the two weeks that 
overlap the calendar week. Price volatility is calculated for the 
contemporaneous week in a manner similar to the way yield 
volatility is calculated in Chart 2.
The GovPX share variable is statistically significant (at the 5 per-
cent level) for all notes for the bid-ask spread and price impact 
measures (and of the expected sign) and is significant for the ten-
year note for the quote and trade size measures. Volatility and the 
dummy variable are mostly significant for the notes for the spread, 
quote size, and price impact measures. The share variables are 
never significant for the bills, probably because GovPX bill 
coverage is not declining (and is close to 100 percent) over the 
sample period. Accordingly, the liquidity measures for the bills are 
not adjusted.
The bid-ask spread, quote size, trade size, and price impact 
measures are then adjusted by adding to the raw measures the 
applicable regression coefficient multiplied by the difference 
between the GovPX coverage ratio for the whole sample and the 
GovPX coverage ratio for that week. For example, the regression 
coefficient for the bid-ask spread for the two-year note is -0.21 and 
the relevant GovPX coverage ratio for the entire sample is 
62 percent. In a week in which the ratio equals 52 percent, the 
adjusted bid-ask spread equals the raw bid-ask spread -0.02 32nds 
(-0.02 = -0.21 * (0.62-0.52)).
Adjusted trading frequency figures are then calculated by 
dividing adjusted trading volume figures by adjusted trade size 
figures.
The adjusted liquidity measures are employed throughout this 
article, reported in the descriptive tables and charts, and used in the 
statistical analyses.a Adjusted numbers do not appear in Table 10 
or Charts 1, 2, and 11, as yields, yield spreads, and volatilities are 
not adjusted (the measures that employ these variables should be 
relatively unaffected by changes in GovPX coverage). The data in 
Chart 3 are also not adjusted, as one purpose of that chart is to 
illustrate the decline in GovPX coverage.
The most significant effects on the results of these adjustments 
are the leveling out of the time series plots of the liquidity 
measures. In particular, adjusted trading volume and trading 
frequency exhibit less of a decline over time, and adjusted bid-ask 
spreads and price impact coefficients exhibit less of an increase. 
The results in the tables are relatively unaffected by the 
adjustments. As mentioned, the adjustment methodology is not 
intended to correct for biases in the measures due to the overall 
level of GovPX coverage, so one would not expect the descriptive 
statistics for the measures to change much.
aIn particular, note that adjusted net trading volume and net 
trading frequency figures are employed in the regression analyses of 
Table 8 and endnotes 17 and 18. In contrast, the weekly price 
impact coefficients in Table 9 and Chart 10 are adjusted after having 
been estimated with unadjusted data.88 Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity
Chart 1
Ten-Year U.S. Treasury Note Yield
and Fed Funds Target Rate
Source: Bloomberg.
Notes: The thin line represents the Treasury yield; the thick line
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Chart 2
Three-Month Bill and Ten-Year Note Yield Volatility
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The chart plots standard deviations of thirty-minute yield
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hours prevents the relatively inactive overnight hours from 
having undue influence. The trading activity measures 
(volume, trading frequency, and trade size) are reported for the 
full day, however, for consistency with figures reported by the 
Federal Reserve and GovPX.
The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000. 
The sample thus covers the Thai baht devaluation in July 1997, 
the equity market declines in October 1997, the financial 
market turmoil of fall 1998, and the Treasury’s debt 
management announcements of early 2000. Chart 1 illustrates 
some of these developments and plots the ten-year Treasury 
note yield and the fed funds target rate.
Chart 2 depicts the yield volatilities of the three-month 
bill and ten-year note, calculated weekly as the standard 
deviations of thirty-minute yield changes (computed using 
bid-ask midpoints). It reveals that volatilities of both 
securities reach their highest levels during the fall 1998 
financial market turmoil (the week ending October 9). Both 
also spike to shorter peaks at the time of the October 1997 
equity market declines (the week ending October 31) and at 
the time of the Treasury’s February 2000 quarterly 
refunding meeting (the week ending February 4).
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Trading Volume
Chart 3 presents average daily trading volume by week using 
both GovPX data and data reported to the Federal Reserve by 
the primary dealers. As discussed, GovPX coverage of the 
interdealer market has been decreasing, causing GovPX 
volume to decline at a faster pace than interdealer broker 
volume reported to the Federal Reserve. Another long-term 
trend visible in Chart 3 is the stability of dealer-to-customer 
activity, even as interdealer activity has declined, causing the 
two series to converge in early 2000.
Looking at shorter term trends, we note that all three series 
drop off sharply in the final weeks of each year. This pattern likely 
reflects early holiday closes, lower staffing levels, and decreased 
willingness to take on new positions before year-end. Market 
participants characterize such low-volume periods as illiquid 
(Wall Street Journal 1997, 1998a). Volumes in all three series also 
rise together to peaks in late October 1997 and in the fall of 1998, 
when market volatility is quite high. These high-volume periods 
are also characterized by poor liquidity (Wall Street Journal 1998b; 
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Chart 4
Daily Trading Volume of U.S. Treasury Notes
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The chart plots mean daily interdealer trading volume by week
for the on-the-run notes.
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Chart 3
Daily Trading Volume of U.S. Treasury Securities
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Federal Reserve
Bulletin and GovPX.
Note: The chart plots mean daily trading volume by week for the
indicated series.
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Daily GovPX trading volume descriptive statistics for each 
of the on-the-run bills and notes can be found in Table 1.13 The 
two-year note is shown to be the most actively traded security 
among the brokers reporting to GovPX, with a mean (median) 
daily volume of $6.8 billion ($6.7 billion). The six-month bill 
is the least active, with a mean (median) daily volume of 
$0.8 billion ($0.8 billion).
Average daily note trading volume by week is plotted in 
Chart 4.14 Activity for each of the notes tends to follow the 
patterns for total trading activity observed in Chart 3. Volume 
is positively correlated across securities, especially for notes, 
with the five- and ten-year notes the most correlated 
(correlation coefficient = 0.75).
4.2 Trading Frequency
Daily trading frequency descriptive statistics for the on-the-
run bills and notes are reported in Table 2. The table shows 
that the most actively traded security in terms of volume—
the two-year note—is only the third most actively traded in 
terms of frequency. The five-year note is the most frequently 
traded, with a mean (median) of 687 (678) trades per day. 
The six-month bill is again the least actively traded security, 
with a mean (median) of just forty-one (thirty-nine) trades 
per day.
Table 1




Three-month bill 1.28 1.18 0.70
Six-month bill 0.84 0.76 0.51
One-year bill 2.01 1.82 0.99
Two-year note 6.81 6.67 2.53
Five-year note 5.54 5.46 1.98
Ten-year note 3.77 3.69 1.32
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on daily interdealer trading 
volume for the indicated on-the-run securities in billions of U.S. dollars. 
The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.
Table 2




Three-month bill 56.2 53 26.2
Six-month bill 41.4 39 19.8
One-year bill 107.7 98 48.9
Two-year note 482.9 463.7 177.6
Five-year note 687.5 677.7 225.5
Ten-year note 597.6 600.4 174.9
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on the daily number of 
interdealer trades for the indicated on-the-run securities. The sample 
period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.90 Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity
Chart 5
Daily Trading Frequency of U.S. Treasury Notes
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The chart plots the mean daily number of interdealer trades
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Chart 6
Bid-Ask Spreads of U.S. Treasury Notes
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The chart plots mean interdealer bid-ask spreads by week
for the on-the-run notes.
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In Chart 5, we present average daily note trading 
frequency by week. The patterns there are quite similar to 
those for trading volume (Chart 4), although differences in 
trade size affect the ordering of the plotted lines. Trading 
frequency is also positively correlated across securities, with 
the five- and ten-year notes the most correlated (correlation 
coefficient = 0.85).
4.3 Bid-Ask Spreads
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for average daily bid-
ask spreads for the on-the-run bills and notes. Consistent 
with market quoting conventions, bill bid-ask spreads are 
reported in basis points, based on the discount rate, and 
note bid-ask spreads are reported in 32nds of a point, where 
one point equals 1 percent of par.15 The longer maturity 
securities, which tend to be more volatile (in price terms), 
also have wider bid-ask spreads (in price terms). The ten-
year note thus has an average spread of 0.78 32nds, whereas 
the two-year note has an average spread of 0.21 32nds. The 
one-year bill has the narrowest spread among the bills in 
terms of yield, at 0.52 basis point, but the widest spread 
among the bills in terms of price (the conversion from yield 
to price involves multiplying the yield by the duration of the 
security).
Chart 6 plots average note bid-ask spreads by week. The 
prominent features of the chart are the upward spikes in spreads 
that occur in late October 1997, October 1998, and February 2000, 
coinciding with the volatility spikes in Chart 2. The spreads also 
tend to widen in the final weeks of each year, albeit not as much for 
notes as for bills. Bid-ask spreads are positively correlated across 
securities, with the five- and ten-year notes again the most 
correlated (correlation coefficient = 0.88).
4.4 Quote Sizes
Descriptive statistics for average daily quote sizes for the on-
the-run bills and notes appear in Table 4. The quote sizes are 
the quantity of securities bid for or offered for sale at the best 
bid and offer prices in the interdealer market (minimum quote 
sizes are $5 million for bills and $1 million for notes), and the 
averages are calculated using both bid and offer quantities. 
Table 3




Three-month bill 0.71 bp 0.61 bp 0.45 bp
Six-month bill 0.74 bp 0.66 bp 0.34 bp
One-year bill 0.52 bp 0.48 bp 0.25 bp
Two-year note 0.21 32nds 0.20 32nds 0.03 32nds
Five-year note 0.39 32nds 0.37 32nds 0.10 32nds
Ten-year note 0.78 32nds 0.73 32nds 0.20 32nds
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily interdealer 
bid-ask spreads for the indicated on-the-run securities. The sample 
period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000. bp is basis points;
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Chart 7
Quote Sizes of U.S. Treasury Notes
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots mean interdealer quote sizes by week for the
on-the-run notes. Quote sizes are the quantity of securities bid for or
offered for sale at the best bid and offer prices in the interdealer market;
the mean weekly figure is calculated with both bid and offer quantities.
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Quote sizes are largest for the two-year note, with an average 
size of $24.5 million, and smallest for the ten-year note, with an 
average size of $7.9 million.
Chart 7 presents average quote sizes by week for the 
notes. It shows that quote sizes decline steeply during the 
financial market turmoil of fall 1998. Although they are not 
easy to identify amid somewhat volatile series, quote sizes 
also decline during the weeks ending October 31, 1997; 
October 9, 1998; and February 4, 2000 (when volatility and 
bid-ask spreads spike higher). Quote sizes are positively 
correlated across securities, especially for notes, with the 
two- and five-year notes the most correlated (correlation 
coefficient = 0.87).
4.5 Trade Sizes
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for average daily trade sizes 
for the on-the-run bills and notes. We see that average trade 
size decreases monotonically with security maturity, from 
$22.5 million for the three-month bill to $6.2 million for the 
ten-year note. As discussed in Section 3, trade sizes are 
calculated to reflect the quantity negotiation that occurs 
between counterparties in a workup process. Trades may 
therefore be for quantities in excess of the quoted size, although 
they can also be for quantities smaller than the quoted size. 
Empirically, average trade size exceeds average quote size for 
each of the bills, but average quote size exceeds average trade 
size for each of the notes.
Chart 8 plots average note trade sizes by week. Trade sizes 
are shown to decline in fall 1998, albeit less so than quote sizes. 
Furthermore, trade sizes decline only modestly or even increase 
in some of the most volatile weeks of the sample period. Trade 
sizes tend to be positively correlated across securities, with the 
two- and five-year notes the most correlated (correlation 
coefficient = 0.77).
Table 4




Three-month bill 16.9 14.9 8.6
Six-month bill 15.5 14.1 6.1
One-year bill 17.2 16.4 5.6
Two-year note 24.5 23.0 7.8
Five-year note 10.7 10.3 2.7
Ten-year note 7.9 7.6 2.2
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily inter-
dealer quote sizes for the indicated on-the-run securities in millions 
of U.S. dollars. Quote sizes are the quantity of securities bid for or 
offered for sale at the best bid and offer prices in the interdealer market; 
the mean daily figure is calculated with both bid and offer quantities. The 
sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.
Table 5




Three-month bill 22.5 22.0 6.3
Six-month bill 19.7 19.0 6.0
One-year bill 18.4 18.0 3.4
Two-year note 14.2 13.9 2.1
Five-year note 8.0 8.0 1.0
Ten-year note 6.2 6.2 0.8
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily interdealer 
trade sizes for the indicated on-the-run securities in millions of U.S. 
dollars. The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.92 Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity
Chart 8
Trade Sizes of U.S. Treasury Notes
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The chart plots mean interdealer trade sizes by week for the
on-the-run notes.
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Chart 9
Net Number of Trades versus Price Change
by Day for the Two-Year U.S. Treasury Note
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots the daily net number of interdealer trades
versus the daily price change for the on-the-run two-year note. The
net number of trades equals the number of buyer-initiated less seller-
initiated trades. Days on which a new two-year note was auctioned
and for which the day’s price change cannot be calculated are
excluded. The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.
Price change (32nds of a point)
Net number of trades










4.6 Price Impact Coefficients
As discussed in Section 2, a popular measure of liquidity relates 
net trading activity to price changes. Net trading activity is 
typically defined—and is defined here—as buyer-initiated 
activity less seller-initiated activity. Descriptive statistics for 
daily net trading volume for the on-the-run bills and notes can 
be found in Table 6, while statistics on the daily net number of 
trades are offered in Table 7. In both tables, the means 
(medians) are positive for every security except the one-year 
bill, and the two-year note has the highest means (medians), 
with $0.30 billion ($0.24 billion) net volume per day and 
34.6 (31.1) net trades per day. The predominance of buyer-
initiated activity may reflect the tendency of dealers’ customers 
to be net buyers and of dealers to offset customer trades in the 
interdealer market.16
Preliminary descriptive evidence relating net trading 
activity to price changes is shown in Chart 9. The chart plots the 
daily net number of trades against the daily price change for the 
on-the-run two-year note. As expected, the relationship is 
Table 6




Three-month bill 0.16 0.09 0.44
Six-month bill 0.02 0.01 0.30
One-year bill -0.04 -0.05 0.41
Two-year note 0.30 0.24 0.78
Five-year note 0.16 0.13 0.51
Ten-year note 0.11 0.10 0.38
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on daily net interdealer 
trading volume for the indicated on-the-run securities in billions of U.S. 
dollars. Net trading volume equals buyer-initiated less seller-initiated 
volume. The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.
Table 7




Three-month bill 6.6 5 13.2
Six-month bill 1.4 1 9.9
One-year bill -0.3 0 16.1
Two-year note 34.6 31.1 39.9
Five-year note 29.7 27.9 46.5
Ten-year note 18.2 17.2 38.0
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on the daily net number 
of interdealer trades for the indicated on-the-run securities. The net 
number of trades equals the number of buyer-initiated less seller-initiated 
trades. The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2003 93
positive, showing that buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trades 
are associated with rising (falling) prices. A positive but weaker 
relationship is observed when daily net trading volume is 
plotted against the daily price change.
To examine more closely the relationship between price 
changes and net trading activity, we regress five-minute price 
changes, computed using bid-ask midpoints, on various 
measures of trading activity over the same interval. Analysis at 
this high frequency allows for a precise estimation of the 
relationship for the full sample, as well as for the relationship 
to be estimated fairly reliably on a weekly basis. At the same 
time, asynchronous arrival of trades and quotes, the 
commingling of data provided by different brokers, and the 
time lag between trade initiation and completion suggest that 
the data be aggregated to a certain extent, and not examined on 
a tick-by-tick basis.
The results from five regression models estimated over the 
entire sample period for the on-the-run two-year note are 
contained in Table 8. In model 1, price changes are regressed 
on the net number of trades. The slope coefficient is positive, as 
predicted, and highly significant. The coefficient of 0.0465 
implies that about twenty-two trades, net, move the price of the 
two-year note by 1 32nd of a point. The adjusted R2 statistic of 
0.322 implies that more than 30 percent of the variation in 
price changes is accounted for by this one measure.
The high explanatory power of the model may seem 
somewhat surprising. Many of the sharpest price changes in 
this market occur with little trading upon the arrival of public 
information (Fleming and Remolona 1999). Nonetheless, 
studies of another market where much of the relevant 
information is thought to be public—the FX market—have 
found comparable or higher R2 statistics. Evans and Lyons’ 
(2002) model of daily exchange rate changes, for example, 
produces an R2 statistic of more than 60 percent for the 
deutsche mark/dollar and more than 40 percent for the 
yen/dollar, with the explanatory power almost wholly due to 
order flow.
In model 2, we regress price changes on net trading volume, 
incorporating trade size into the analysis. The slope coefficient 
is again positive and highly significant, although less significant 
than in model 1. Net trading volume is therefore less effective 
at explaining price changes than is the net number of trades. 
The adjusted R2 of the model is a much lower 0.138.
Price changes are regressed in model 3 on both the net 
number of trades and net trading volume. The coefficient on 
the net number of trades is similar to that in model 1, albeit 
slightly larger, but the coefficient on net trading volume is 
negative and significant. Controlling for the sign of a trade, we 
observe that larger trade sizes seem to be associated with 
smaller price changes. The explanatory power of the model is 
Table 8
Price Impact of Trades for the Two-Year U.S. Treasury Note
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant -0.0169 -0.0055 -0.0178 -0.1898 0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Net number of trades 0.0465 0.0528
(0.0004) (0.0006)
Net trading volume 0.0161 -0.0045
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Proportion of trades buyer-initiated 0.3575
(0.0023)
Number of buyer-initiated trades 0.0432
(0.0005)
Number of seller-initiated trades -0.0505
(0.0007)
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.138 0.327 0.213 0.324
Number of observations 74,952 74,952 74,952 74,952 74,952
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports results from regressions of five-minute price changes on various measures of trading activity over the same interval for the on-the-
run two-year note. Price changes are computed using bid-ask midpoints and are measured in 32nds of a point. The net number of trades equals the number 
of buyer-initiated less seller-initiated trades. Net trading volume equals buyer-initiated less seller-initiated volume and is measured in tens of millions of U.S. 
dollars. Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) standard errors are reported in parentheses. The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.94 Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity
slightly better than that of model 1, with an adjusted R2 of 
0.327.
The relationship between trading volume and price changes 
is likely muddled by the endogenous nature of trade size. The 
observed trade size depends on the outcome of a negotiation 
that itself depends on the liquidity of the market. When the 
market is liquid, a dealer may well be able to execute a large 
trade at the best quoted price either because the quoted 
quantity is large or because the dealer can negotiate a larger 
quantity. When the market is illiquid, it is less likely that a 
dealer could execute a large trade at the best quoted price either 
because the quoted quantity is small or because the dealer is 
unable to negotiate a larger quantity. Large trades may 
therefore be a gauge of a liquid market, in which trades have 
less of a price impact.
The finding that trading frequency is more relevant than 
trading volume is consistent with the findings of other 
Treasury market studies. Green (forthcoming) finds that trade 
size has little influence on the price impact of trades around 
macroeconomic announcements. Cohen and Shin (2003) 
report lower R2 statistics for models of price changes that 
incorporate trade size. Huang, Cai, and Wang (2002) examine 
the relationship between volatility and various measures of 
trading activity and find that volatility is positively correlated 
with trading frequency, but negatively correlated with trade 
size. A related equity market study by Jones, Kaul, and Lipson 
(1994) finds that trading frequency explains the relationship 
between volatility and trading volume, with trade size having 
little incremental information content.
We regress in model 4 price changes on the proportion of 
buyer-initiated trades. The coefficient is positive and highly 
significant, albeit less so than the net number of trades. The 
adjusted R2 is 0.213.
Finally, in model 5, price changes are regressed on the 
number of buyer- and seller-initiated trades separately. Both 
coefficients are of the predicted sign and highly significant, 
with buys associated with price increases and sells with price 
decreases. Interestingly, the magnitude of the seller-initiated 
coefficient is larger, and significantly so, suggesting that sells 
have a greater effect on prices than buys. It was suggested 
earlier that dealers’ customers tend to be buyers, reflecting 
dealers’ underwriting role in the primary market. It may also 
follow that buys convey less information than sells because a 
certain proportion of buys simply reflects rollover by 
customers from maturing to newly issued securities.
Estimation results for the five models are qualitatively the 
same for the other on-the-run securities: the net number of 
trades is more important than net volume, the sign of the net 
volume coefficient flips in model 3, and sells have a greater 
price impact than buys. The results are also quite similar when 
the interval of analysis is expanded to ten minutes, fifteen 
minutes, or thirty minutes.17 Finally, the results are 
qualitatively similar when model 1 is expanded to include the 
net number of trades in the previous interval, although the lags 
are statistically significant for some securities.18
To show how the price impact of trades varies over time, we 
use model 1 to estimate price impact coefficients on a weekly 
basis for each of the on-the-run bills and notes. Table 9 reports 
descriptive statistics for these coefficients. As with the bid-ask 
spreads, bill statistics are reported in basis points and note 
statistics in 32nds of a point (the reported bill coefficients are 
made positive by multiplying the actual coefficients by -1). The 
longer maturity securities, which tend to be more volatile (in 
terms of price), have the highest coefficients (in terms of price). 
The ten-year note thus has an average coefficient of 0.17 32nds. 
The shorter term securities have the highest coefficients in 
terms of yield, such that the three-month bill has an average 
coefficient of 0.15 basis point.19
Table 9




Three-month bill 0.15 bp 0.15 bp 0.07 bp
Six-month bill 0.14 bp 0.13 bp 0.05 bp
One-year bill 0.12 bp 0.11 bp 0.05 bp
Two-year note 0.04 32nds 0.04 32nds 0.01 32nds
Five-year note 0.10 32nds 0.09 32nds 0.02 32nds
Ten-year note 0.17 32nds 0.17 32nds 0.04 32nds
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on the weekly price impact 
coefficients for the indicated on-the-run securities. The coefficients 
come from regressions of five-minute price changes on the net number 
of trades over the same interval. Price changes are computed using bid-
ask midpoints and are measured in yield terms (in basis points, or bp) 
for the bills and in price terms (in 32nds of a point) for the notes (the 
reported bill coefficients are made positive by multiplying the actual 
coefficients by -1). The net number of trades equals the number of 
buyer-initiated less seller-initiated trades. The sample period is 
December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.
The finding that trading frequency is more 
relevant than trading volume is consistent 
with the findings of other Treasury market 
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Chart 10
Price Impact of U.S. Treasury Note Trades
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots the price impact of interdealer trades by week
for the on-the-run notes.  The price impact is measured as the slope
coefficient from a regression of five-minute price changes on the net
number of trades over the same interval. The net number of trades
equals the number of buyer-initiated less seller-initiated trades.
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Chart 11
On-the-Run/Off-the-Run Yield Spreads
of U.S. Treasury Notes
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Bear Stearns
and GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots mean on-the-run/off-the-run yield spreads by
week for the indicated securities. The spreads are calculated daily as
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The weekly price impact coefficients for the notes are 
illustrated in Chart 10. Except for the scale of the y-axis, the 
chart is almost indistinguishable from that of the bid-ask 
spreads (Chart 6). The price impact coefficients spike upward 
in late October 1997, October 1998, and February 2000, 
coinciding with the volatility spikes in Chart 2 and the bid-ask 
spread spikes in Chart 6. The coefficients also tend to increase 
in the final weeks of each year, as do the bid-ask spreads. The 
price impact coefficients are positively correlated across 
securities, especially for notes, with the five- and ten-year notes 
the most correlated (correlation coefficient = 0.84).
4.7 On-the-Run/Off-the-Run Yield Spreads
Table 10 provides descriptive statistics for daily on-the-run/
off-the-run yield spreads. The spreads are calculated as the 
differences between the end-of-day yields of the on-the-run 
and first off-the-run securities.20 Positive spreads indicate 
that on-the-run securities are trading with a lower yield, or 
higher price, than off-the-run securities. As expected, the 
table shows that average spreads for the coupon securities 
are positive, with the ten-year note having the highest mean 
(median) at 5.6 basis points (5.4 basis points). Bill spreads 
are negative, on average, probably reflecting a small 
liquidity premium for on-the-run bills along with an 
upward-sloping yield curve over the sample period.21
Average daily on-the-run/off-the-run note yield spreads by 
week are plotted in Chart 11. The two- and five-year note 
spreads are shown to increase sharply during the financial 
market turmoil of fall 1998, peaking in the week ending 
October 16, 1998. Besides this episode, changes in the two 
spreads often diverge, and do not appear to be closely related to 
market developments. The ten-year-note spread behaves 
Table 10
On-the-Run/Off-the-Run Yield Spreads




Three-month bill -2.35 -2.00 3.22
Six-month bill -1.43 -1.21 2.45
One-year bill -2.07 -2.05 3.80
Two-year note 1.53 1.46 2.43
Five-year note 3.33 2.62 2.97
Ten-year note 5.63 5.44 3.66
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Bear Stearns and 
GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on daily on-the-run/off-the-
run yield spreads for the indicated securities. The spreads are calculated as 
the differences between the end-of-day yields of the on-the-run and first 
off-the-run securities. The sample period is December 30, 1996, to 
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independently of other securities’ spreads, and decreases to its 
lowest level in the sample period during the fall 1998 financial 
market turmoil. This episode is indicative of the difficulties 
estimating liquidity spreads for the ten-year note.22 The yield 
spreads are positively correlated across securities, with the one-
year bill and two-year note the most correlated (correlation 
coefficient = 0.59).
5. Comparison of Liquidity Measures
An evaluation of the various liquidity measures is somewhat 
problematic because there is no single gauge of liquidity against 
which the measures can be definitively judged. That being said, 
there are ways in which the measures can be assessed. First, a 
liquidity measure that directly quantifies the cost of transacting 
is, a priori, likely a better measure of liquidity. Second, a liquidity 
measure should probably behave in a manner consistent with 
market participants’ views about liquidity. Finally, a good 
liquidity measure should be easy to calculate and understand, 
and available to market participants on a real-time basis.
By the first two criteria, the bid-ask spread and price impact 
coefficient are superior liquidity measures. Both measures 
directly quantify the costs of transacting, with the bid-ask 
spread measuring the cost of executing a single trade of limited 
size and the price impact coefficient measuring the price effects 
of a trade. Both measures also correlate with episodes of 
reported poor liquidity in the expected manner, rising sharply 
during the market disruptions of October 1997, October 1998, 
and February 2000. On the last criterion, the bid-ask spread 
dominates the price impact coefficient. The spread is easy to 
calculate and understand, and available on a real-time basis. In 
contrast, estimating the price impact coefficient requires 
significant data and regression analysis, and it may not be 
estimable on a timely basis because of data limitations.
The other liquidity measures may be less informative than 
the bid-ask spread and price impact coefficient, yet may still 
contain useful information about liquidity. In particular, the 
other measures may serve as good proxies for liquidity and/or 
contain information about liquidity not present in the other 
measures. To describe the various measures and the extent to 
which one measure might be a suitable proxy for another, we 
compare them by using correlation and principal-components 
analyses.
5.1 Correlation Analysis
The correlation coefficients among the various measures, as 
calculated weekly for the on-the-run two-year note, are 
presented in Table 11. The table shows that the two preferred 
liquidity measures—the bid-ask spread and price impact 
coefficient—are highly correlated with one another 
(correlation coefficient = 0.73). (The correlation coefficients 
are even higher for the other on-the-run securities.) These 
results suggest that one measure is an excellent proxy for the 
other. Therefore, even if one prefers the price impact 
coefficient as a liquidity measure, the easy-to-calculate bid-ask 
spread is probably a good substitute.
Quote size, trade size, and on-the-run/off-the-run yield 
spread are correlated with the bid-ask spread, price impact 
coefficient, and one another in the expected manner (this 
correlation is generally true for the other on-the-run securities as 
well). Higher quote sizes, higher trade sizes, and narrower yield 
spreads are thus associated with narrower bid-ask spreads and 
smaller price impact coefficients. Quote size, in particular, is 
strongly correlated with the other measures. Trade size and yield 
spread, in contrast, are more modestly correlated with the other 
measures, suggesting that they are weaker liquidity proxies.
An evaluation of the various liquidity 
measures is somewhat problematic 
because there is no single gauge of 
liquidity against which the measures can 
be definitively judged. That being said, 
there are ways in which the measures can 
be assessed.
Even if one prefers the price impact 
coefficient as a liquidity measure, the 
easy-to-calculate bid-ask spread is 
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Trading volume and trading frequency are the most 
correlated measures (correlation coefficient = 0.91). For the 
two-year note, their correlations with the other measures are 
generally consistent, such that higher trading activity is 
associated with lower liquidity. The correlations with the bid-
ask spread are quite modest, however. Moreover, for the other 
on-the-run securities, the correlations are often inconsistent 
and close to zero. These results suggest that trading activity is 
not a reliable proxy for market liquidity.
Table 11 also reports correlations between our liquidity 
measures and price volatility. Price volatility is correlated with 
the liquidity measures in a consistent way, with higher volatility 
associated with lower liquidity. Moreover, the magnitudes of the 
correlation coefficients suggest that price volatility itself is a good 
liquidity proxy. In particular, price volatility appears to be an 
excellent proxy for the price impact coefficient given the high 
correlation between the two (correlation coefficient = 0.84).
5.2 Principal-Components Analysis
Results of the principal-components analysis for the on-the-
run two-year note appear in Table 12. The reported eigenvalues 
of the principal components show that three components 
provide a good summary of the data, explaining 87 percent of 
the standardized variance (0.87 = (3.80+1.17+1.11)/7). The 
first component seems to measure variation in liquidity that is 
negatively related to trading activity, as it loads positively on 
trading volume and trading frequency, and it loads on the other 
variables in a manner suggesting lower liquidity. The second 
and third components seem to measure variation in liquidity 
that is positively related to trading activity, as they load 
positively on trading volume and trading frequency, and they 
generally load on the other variables in a manner suggesting 
higher liquidity. The other components are harder to interpret.
The first two principal components are represented in 
Chart 12. The plot of the first component looks somewhat 
similar to plots of volatility (Chart 2), bid-ask spreads (Chart 6), 
and price impact coefficients (Chart 10). Not surprisingly, the 
correlation between the first component and price volatility 
(for the two-year note) is quite high (correlation coefficient = 
0.82). As a result, another way to interpret the first component 
is that it measures variation in liquidity that is correlated with 
volatility. The plot of the second component looks similar to 
plots of trading volume (Chart 4) and trading frequency (Chart 5). 
This component is more weakly correlated with price volatility 
(correlation coefficient = 0.16). As a result, another way to 
interpret the second component is that it measures variation in 
liquidity consistent with changes in trading activity, but not 
volatility. The third component (not shown) picks up a long-
term deterioration of liquidity from late 1998 until mid-1999 
and is also only weakly correlated with price volatility 
(correlation coefficient = 0.16).
Results from principal-components analyses on the other 
securities are reasonably similar. Across securities, one of the 
Table 11












Trading volume 1.00 0.91 0.19 -0.44 0.00 0.60 0.41 0.69
Trading frequency 0.91 1.00 0.17 -0.64 -0.39 0.65 0.45 0.71
Bid-ask spread 0.19 0.17 1.00 -0.46 -0.08 0.73 0.32 0.54
Quote size -0.44 -0.64 -0.46 1.00 0.64 -0.73 -0.45 -0.60
Trade size 0.00 -0.39 -0.08 0.64 1.00 -0.30 -0.17 -0.22
Price impact 0.60 0.65 0.73 -0.73 -0.30 1.00 0.56 0.84
Yield spread 0.41 0.45 0.32 -0.45 -0.17 0.56 1.00 0.50
Price volatility 0.69 0.71 0.54 -0.60 -0.22 0.84 0.50 1.00
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports correlation coefficients of liquidity measures and price volatility for the on-the-run two-year note. The measures are calculated weekly 
as mean daily trading volume, mean daily trading frequency, mean bid-ask spread, mean quote size, mean trade size, price impact coefficient, mean on-the-run/
off-the-run yield spread, and standard deviation of thirty-minute price changes. The price impact coefficients come from regressions of five-minute price 
changes on the net number of trades over the same interval. Correlation coefficients with absolute values of 0.13 and higher, 0.15 and higher, and 0.20 and 
higher are significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.98 Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity
Chart 12
First and Second Principal Components of Liquidity
Measures for the Two-Year U.S. Treasury Note
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The chart plots the first and second standardized principal
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first two components loads positively on the trading activity 
measures, the bid-ask spread, and the price impact coefficient, 
and one loads positively on the trading activity measures but 
negatively (or close to zero) on the other two measures.
6.C o n c l u s i o n
Our estimation and evaluation of various liquidity measures 
for the U.S. Treasury market reveal that the simple bid-ask 
spread is a useful measure for assessing and tracking liquidity. 
The spread can be calculated quickly and easily with data that 
are widely available on a real-time basis, yet it is highly 
correlated with the more sophisticated price impact measure 
and is correlated with episodes of reported poor liquidity in the 
expected manner. The bid-ask spread thus increases sharply 
with the equity market declines in October 1997, with the 
financial market turmoil in the fall of 1998, and with the 
market disruptions around the Treasury’s quarterly refunding 
announcement in February 2000.
By contrast, quote size, trade size, and the on-the-run/off-
the-run yield spread are found to be only modest proxies for 
market liquidity. These measures correlate less strongly with 
Table 12
Principal-Components Analysis of Liquidity Measures for the Two-Year U.S. Treasury Note
Principal Components
1234567
Eigenvalue 3.80 1.17 1.11 0.63 0.19 0.10 0.00
Sensitivities
Trading volume 0.74 0.63 0.16 -0.16 0.00 -0.05 -0.04
Trading frequency 0.85 0.32 0.38 -0.12 0.10 -0.05 0.05
Bid-ask spread 0.57 -0.25 -0.73 -0.22 0.10 -0.16 0.00
Quote size -0.85 0.35 -0.13 0.06 0.36 0.03 0.00
Trade size -0.47 0.69 -0.52 -0.02 -0.19 0.02 0.02
Price impact 0.91 -0.04 -0.30 -0.10 0.06 0.26 0.00
Yield spread 0.66 0.10 -0.16 0.73 0.02 -0.04 0.00
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The table reports eigenvalues and sensitivities from a principal-components analysis of seven liquidity measures for the on-the-run two-year note. 
Sensitivities are calculated as the eigenvectors of the correlation matrix times the square root of the eigenvalues. The liquidity measures are calculated weekly 
as mean daily trading volume, mean daily trading frequency, mean bid-ask spread, mean quote size, mean trade size, price impact coefficient, and mean on-
the-run/off-the-run yield spread. The price impact coefficients come from regressions of five-minute price changes on the net number of trades over the 
same interval. The sample period is December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2003 99
the episodes of reported poor liquidity and with the bid-ask 
spread and price impact measures. Moreover, trading volume 
and trading frequency are weak proxies for market liquidity, as 
both high and low levels of trading activity are associated with 
periods of poor liquidity.
Additional findings obtained here complement those of 
recent FX and equity market studies. Consistent with results 
from the FX market, we find a strong relationship between 
order flow and price changes in the Treasury market, with a 
simple model of price changes producing an R2 statistic above 
30 percent for the two-year note. And in line with equity 
market studies, we find considerable commonality in liquidity 
in the U.S. Treasury market, across securities as well as 
measures.
More generally, our study illustrates the value of high-
frequency data for assessing and tracking U.S. Treasury market 
liquidity. The availability of such data, combined with the 
market’s importance and distinct organizational structure, 
make the Treasury market an appealing setting for continued 
work on securities liquidity.100 Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity
Appendix : Data Cleaning and Processing
GovPX historical tick data files provide a complete history of 
the real-time trading information distributed to GovPX 
subscribers through on-line vendors. The format of these files 
necessitates that the data be processed before they are analyzed. 
Some data cleaning is also called for to screen out the interdealer 
brokers’ posting errors that are not filtered out by GovPX.
Trades
As discussed in the text, trades in the interdealer market often 
go through a workup process in which a broker mediates an 
increase in the trade size beyond the amount quoted. For 
example, as of 9:36:38 a.m. on March 4, 1999, $1 million par 
was bid at 97.5625 (97-18) for the on-the-run five-year U.S. 
Treasury note.23 At 9:38:06, the bid was “hit” for $1 million; the 
trade size was then negotiated up to $18 million through 
incremental trades of $9 million and $8 million.
The GovPX historical tick data files capture the richness of 
these transactions, as shown in the table and described below:
• As of 9:36:38, $1 million par is bid at 97.5625 (97-18) 
and $6 million par is offered at 97.578125 (97-18+). 
The last trade for this security was a $4 million “take” (a 
buyer-initiated trade, designated by the “T” in the Last 
Trade Side field) at 97.5625 (97-18). No trades are being 
executed at the time, as indicated by the zeros in the 
workup fields. Aggregate trading volume for this 
security since the beginning of the trading day is 
$2,258 million.
• At 9:37:32, the offer price improves to 97.5703125 
(97-182) with an offer size of $9 million.
• At 9:38:06, the bid is “hit” for $1 million. The trans-
action price is recorded in the Current Hit Workup Price 
field and the size (at that point) is recorded in the 
Current Hit Workup Size field. The last trade side, price, 
and size have not yet changed to reflect this new trade.
• At 9:38:10, the offer size is increased to $10 million. The 
initial information about the aforementioned trade is 
repeated on this line.
• At 9:38:12, the negotiated size of the trade that started at 
9:38:06 increases by $9 million, and at 9:38:14, it 
increases by another $8 million. As always, these 
additional quantities are transacted at the same price as 
the initial trade.
• At 9:38:24, the bid size is increased to $11 million. In the 
same second, the last trade side, price, and size are 
updated to reflect the $18 million total traded (in this 
GovPX Historical Tick Data for the On-the-Run Five-Year U.S. Treasury Note
March 4, 1999, 9:36:38 a.m.–9:38:29 a.m.
Last Trade Current Hit Current Take 











9:36:38 97.5625 1 97.578125 6 T 97.5625 4 0 0 0 0 2258
9:37:32 97.5625 1 97.5703125 9 T 97.5625 4 0 0 0 0 2258
9:38:06 97.5625 1 97.5703125 9 T 97.5625 4 97.5625 1 0 0 2258
9:38:10 97.5625 1 97.5703125 10 T 97.5625 4 97.5625 1 0 0 2258
9:38:12 97.5625 1 97.5703125 10 T 97.5625 4 97.5625 9 0 0 2258
9:38:14 97.5625 1 97.5703125 10 T 97.5625 4 97.5625 8 0 0 2258
9:38:24 97.5625 11 97.5703125 10 T 97.5625 4 0 0 0 0 2258
9:38:24 97.5625 11 97.5703125 10 H 97.5625 18 0 0 0 0 2276
9:38:29 97.5625 13 97.5703125 10 H 97.5625 18 0 0 0 0 2276
Source: GovPX.
Note: In addition to the information presented, the tick data files include line counters, security-specific information (such as the CUSIP, security type, 
coupon rate, and maturity date), indicative prices, and the yields associated with each of the prices.Appendix: Data Cleaning and Processing (Continued)
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case, the price does not change because the previous 
trade was executed at the same price). The aggregate 
volume is updated at this point as well and the workup 
fields are cleared.
• At 9:38:29, the bid size is increased to $13 million. The 
last trade side, price, and size and the aggregate volume 
are repeated on this line, and continue to be repeated 
until another trade is completed.
The challenge in processing the data is to identify each trade 
accurately and uniquely. Unfortunately, uniquely identifying 
the incremental trades of the workup processes is difficult, if 
not impossible, given the repetition in the data set and the fact 
that trades of equal size sometimes follow one another. 
However, completed trades can be, and are, accurately and 
uniquely identified by the increases in aggregate volume. For 
the trade discussed, the $18 million increase in aggregate 
volume at 9:38:24 identifies a trade of that size at that time.24
The processed data set contains 1,597,991 trades for the on-
the-run securities examined in our article, or an average of 
1,958 trades per day.
Quotes
As we described, the GovPX historical tick data files are 
constructed in such a way that a change in any field results in a 
reprinting of every field on a subsequent line. This construction 
not only results in a repetition of trade information, but in a 
repetition of quote information as well. In the previously cited 
example, identical quote information appears at 9:38:10, 
9:38:12, and 9:38:14, as new information regarding a trade is 
reported.
To prevent the same quote from being counted multiple 
times, the analysis of bid-ask spreads and quote sizes is limited 
to quotes for which the bid price, bid size, offer price, or offer 
size has changed from the previously listed quote for that 
security. A few instances in which the bid or offer quotations 
become erroneously “stuck” at stale values for extended 
periods of time are also excluded.25
The analysis of quote sizes is further limited by the screening 
out of quote sizes in excess of $1,250 million. Many of these 
quote sizes are likely to be erroneous, and they have significant 
influence on statistics summarizing the data.26
The processed data set contains 14,361,862 quote sizes 
(7,186,294 bid sizes and 7,175,568 offer sizes) for the on-the-
run securities examined in our article, or an average of 17,600 
per day.
The analysis of bid-ask spreads makes no use of one-sided 
quotes (quotes for which there is a bid or an offer, but not 
both). Bid-ask spreads that are calculated to be less than 
-2.5 basis points or more than 25 basis points are also excluded. 
Such extreme spreads are likely to be erroneous in a market 
where the average on-the-run spread is close to 0.5 basis 
point.27 As spreads posted by the interdealer brokers do not 
include the brokerage fee charged to the transaction initiator, 
zero spreads (referred to as “locked” markets) are quite 
common and are retained in the data set. In addition, because 
GovPX posts the highest bid and the lowest offer from several 
brokers, even slight negative spreads can be posted 
momentarily and are thus also retained.
The processed data set contains 7,085,037 bid-ask spreads 
for the on-the-run securities examined here, or an average of 
8,683 per day.
Price and Yield Changes
We calculate price and yield changes at five-minute, thirty-
minute, and one-day intervals for various purposes. In all cases, 
the changes are calculated from the last observation reported 
for a given interval to the last observation for the subsequent 
interval (for example, from the last price in the 9:25-9:30 
interval to the last price in the 9:30-9:35 interval). The changes 
are calculated using both transaction prices and bid-ask 
midpoint prices. Data thought to be erroneous in calculating 
the bid-ask spreads are excluded from the bid-ask midpoint 
calculations. The data are also checked by identifying 
differences of 10 basis points or more between transaction yield 
changes and bid-ask midpoint yield changes, and then 
screening out data thought to be erroneous.28102 Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity 
Data Gaps
The sample period of December 30, 1996, to March 31, 2000, 
covers 170 complete weeks, or 850 weekdays. After we exclude 
thirty-four holidays, we retain 816 trading days, including 
thirty-nine days on which the market closed early.29 Gaps in 
coverage within New York trading hours occur on January 29, 
1997, from 12:57 to 1:31 p.m.; on June 12, 1998, from 9:31 a.m. 
until the market’s close; on August 13, 1998, from 1:58 to 2:35 p.m.; 
on November 18, 1998, from 3:39 to 4:12 p.m.; and on 
February 4, 1999, from the market’s opening until 11:17 a.m. 
August 26, 1999, is missing completely for the two-year note.30
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1. For a more extensive discussion of the uses and attributes of 
Treasuries, see Fleming (2000a, 2000b).
2. See, for example, Wall Street Journal (1998b) and Committee on the 
Global Financial System (1999).
3. See, for example, Business Week (1999), Wall Street Journal (2000), 
and BondWeek (2001).
4. The Treasury indicated that buybacks “enhance the liquidity of 
Treasury benchmark securities, which promotes overall market liq-
uidity” (January 13, 2000, press release, posted at <http://www.treas.gov/ 
press/releases/ls335.htm>). For discussions of recent debt 
management changes, see Dupont and Sack (1999), Bennett, Garbade, 
and Kambhu (2000), and U.S. General Accounting Office (2001).
5. Exceptions include Garbade and Rosey (1977) and Beim (1992), 
who model bid-ask spreads using low-frequency data. Other studies 
make inferences about Treasury liquidity or about the valuation 
implications of liquidity differences using such proxies for liquidity as 
security age (Sarig and Warga 1989), security type (Amihud and 
Mendelson 1991; Kamara 1994), on-the-run/off-the-run status 
(Warga 1992), and trading volume (Elton and Green 1998).
6. An on-the-run security is the most recently auctioned security of a 
given (original) maturity and an off-the-run security is an older 
security of a given maturity. Off-the-run securities are sometimes 
further classified as first off-the-run (the most recently auctioned off-
the-run security of a given maturity), second off-the-run (the second 
most recently auctioned off-the-run security of a given maturity), and 
so on.
7. In particular, on-the-run securities may trade at a premium because 
of their “specialness” in the repurchase agreement (repo) market. 
Duffie (1996) explains how fee income from lending a security that is 
“on special” in the repo market can supplement the security’s 
principal and interest payments, and hypothesizes that expectations of 
such fees increase the equilibrium price of a security. Jordan and 
Jordan (1997) confirm the hypothesis for Treasury notes, and 
Krishnamurthy (2002) provides corroborating evidence for bonds. 
The relationship between repo market specialness and liquidity is 
complicated, as the two tend to be positively correlated across 
securities (that is, securities that are on special tend to be liquid and 
vice versa), but can be negatively correlated over time, so that an 
increase in specialness is accompanied by a reduction in liquidity.
8. The contributing brokers are Garban-Intercapital, Hilliard Farber, 
and Tullett & Tokyo Liberty. The noncontributing broker is Cantor 
Fitzgerald/eSpeed, which is thought to be more active in the long end 
of the market. Another noncontributing broker, BrokerTec, was 
launched in June 2000 after the end of our sample period.
9. Trades brokered between primary dealers are reported to the 
Federal Reserve by both counterparties and are therefore double 
counted. To provide a more proper comparison, the reported GovPX 
figure also double counts every trade. The comparison is still not 
perfect, however, as a small fraction of GovPX trades have nonprimary 
dealers as counterparties.
10. Unadjusted measures are reported in the working paper version of 
this article (Fleming 2001), available at <http://www.newyorkfed.org/
rmaghome/staff_rp/2001/sr133.html>.
11. In cases where the bid or offer is not competitive, a dealer may be 
able to transact at a price better than the quoted spread by posting a 
limit order inside the quoted spread and having that order hit 
immediately. Such a scenario is most likely to occur for securities that 
are less actively quoted and traded.
12. Fleming (1997) describes the round-the-clock market for Treasury 
securities, and finds that 95 percent of trading volume occurs during 
these hours.
13. Per-security trading activity measures are not double counted and 
should therefore be doubled before comparing them with the 
previously cited total trading volume measures.
14. Comparable charts for bills are available in the working paper 
version of this article (Fleming 2001).
15. The bid-ask spreads are also calculated on a comparable bond-
equivalent yield basis. The means (and medians) in basis points for the 
on-the-run bills and notes in order of increasing maturity are 0.74 
(0.63), 0.79 (0.70), 0.57 (0.52), 0.35 (0.34), 0.29 (0.28), and 0.33 
(0.31).
16. The tendency of dealers’ customers to be net buyers reflects the 
underwriting role of dealers in the primary market. Charts produced 
for the Treasury’s August 2001 quarterly refunding indicate that 
dealers took down 82 percent of the ten-year note and 65 percent of 
the thirty-year bond at the three preceding auctions.104 Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity 
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17. Even at the daily level, the basic relationship between order flow 
and price changes is quite similar. Estimating model 1 using daily data 
for the two-year note (plotted in Chart 9) produces a slope coefficient 
of 0.0363 and an adjusted R2 of 0.213.
18. The models can also be expanded to include the order flow of 
other securities, following Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001). A model of 
price changes for the two-year note that includes the contempora-
neous net number of trades of every on-the-run bill and note produces 
an adjusted R2 of 0.409—and every coefficient is significant.
19. On a comparable bond-equivalent yield basis, the mean 
magnitude of the coefficients in basis points for the on-the-run bills 
and notes in order of increasing maturity are 0.16, 0.15, 0.13, 0.08, 
0.07, and 0.07.
20. This method of calculating the liquidity spread is used in 
numerous studies (see, for example, Dupont and Sack [1999], Furfine 
and Remolona [2002], and Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath [2003]), 
although more sophisticated methods are sometimes used (see, for 
example, Reinhart and Sack [2002]).
21. Liquidity spreads typically are not calculated for bills, presumably 
because of the modest liquidity premia of on-the-run relative to off-
the-run bills. They are included here for completeness.
22. Although the on-the-run ten-year note yield was unusually low 
during the fall 1998 financial market turmoil, the first off-the-run ten-
year note yield was also unusually low, producing a yield difference 
close to zero. Yields of off-the-run ten-year notes have often been 
unusually low because of the absence of noncallable Treasury 
securities with slightly longer maturities. (In the fall of 1998, the oldest 
noncallable thirty-year bond had sixteen and a half years to maturity, 
so there was a gap in the yield curve between ten and sixteen and a half 
years.) This gap makes it difficult to estimate reliably the liquidity 
premium for the ten-year note and explains why studies that look at 
liquidity premia typically disregard this security. It is included here for 
completeness and to illustrate the difficulties estimating liquidity 
premia.
23. As indicated in the text, Treasury notes are quoted in 32nds of a 
point. The price of 97.5625 corresponds to 97 and 18/32, or 97-18. The 
32nds themselves are often split into quarters by the addition of a 2, +, 
or 6 to the price, so that -182 indicates 18¼ 32nds, -18+ indicates 
18½ 32nds, and -186 indicates 18¾ 32nds. 
24. Use of this algorithm uncovers a small number of cases in which a 
security’s aggregate volume decreases, potentially resulting in an 
inferred trade size that is negative. In a few of these cases, the aggregate 
volume counter does not reset at the beginning of the trading day, and 
the data processing is adjusted accordingly. More commonly, the 
decrease in aggregate volume follows, and is similar in magnitude to, 
an earlier trade of very large size. In these situations, the earlier trade 
size is scaled down on the assumption that it was reported erroneously 
and later corrected in the aggregate volume. For example, at 12:45 p.m. 
on July 22, 1998, GovPX reports a trade of $697 million for the two-
year note. Eleven minutes (and six trades) later, GovPX reports a trade 
of $22 million, along with a decrease in aggregate volume of 
$665 million. When the data are processed, the size of the earlier trade 
is reduced to $10 million ($697 million - $665 million - $22 million).
25. This happens for bid quotations for the ten-year note on 
January 28, 1997, from 2:24 p.m. until the market’s close. The same 
bid price and size are reported on every line for that security even as 
offer quotations are changing and seller-initiated trades are executed 
at prices substantively different from the reported bid price. Similar 
episodes occur for offer quotations for the one-year bill on November 6, 
1997, from 10:04 a.m. until 2:19 p.m., and for the six-month bill on 
October 28, 1998, from 11:50 a.m. until the market’s close.
26. One example of such a large quote size occurs at 4:41:24 p.m. on 
September 25, 1997, when the reported bid size for the ten-year note 
increases from $69 million to $2,619 million. Three seconds later, the 
size is revised down to $319 million. Note that a broker inadvertently 
entering “250” as “2550” could have caused the reported increase in 
the quantity bid (as 2,619 - 69 = 2,550 and 319 - 69 = 250).
27. An example of a bid-ask spread that is screened out occurs on 
March 7, 2000, at 10:57:55 a.m. The offer price for the three-month 
bill rises from 5.665 percent to 5.79 percent at that time, causing the 
inferred bid-ask spread to fall from 0.5 basis point to -12 basis points. 
Three seconds later, the offer price returns to 5.665 percent, causing 
the spread to return to 0.5 basis point.
28. For example, at 3:43 p.m. on May 29, 1997, the reported trade 
price of the one-year bill falls from 5.505 percent to 4.505 percent. 
Nineteen minutes (and three trades) later, the reported price rises 
from 4.505 percent to 5.505 percent. Bid and offer prices range from 
5.50 percent to 5.51 percent over this entire period. This is clearly a 
case where trade prices are reported with “handle” errors, and these 
prices are thus excluded from the price change calculations.Endnotes (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2003 105
29. Thirty-four of the early closes occurred at 2:00 p.m., two at 
1:00 p.m., two at 3:00 p.m., and one at noon. Thirty-eight of these 
early closes are associated with holidays; the other early close occurred 
September 16, 1999, due to inclement weather in the New York 
metropolitan area associated with Hurricane Floyd.
30. The security is included in the data file for that day, but no new 
information is reported after 4:57 a.m.References
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